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Making sense of Canada's constitutional impasse for foreign audiences is a
formidable challenge. It involves arcane terms such as "notwithstanding clause" and
"opting out", as well as obscure geographical references, such as Meech Lake. But
the real challenge is to explain the basic intractability of Canada's constitutional
challenge. Throughout the rest of the world, governments change, empires collapse,
the Berlin Wall falls, but Canada's constitutional impasse persists. Yet, the ostensible
issues seem to be so trivial. Why should Canada be fundamentally dived over
whether businesspeople in Quebec should be allowed to use languages other than
French on their signs? Strictly speaking this does not constitute a major
inconvenience for non-Francophones. Nor is it directly linked to the survival of the
French language in Quebec, unlike such questions as the language of instruction in
schools or the language of work.
My proposition is quite simple: the constitucional impasse continues because
it has become the focus of a struggle between two competing nationalisms, both of
which have long histories. In the past these two nationalisms could coexist in the
same political system without challenging its very foundations. But in recent decades
they have taken forms that are increasingly competitive -even mutually exclusive.
Each has reinforced the other, and become more and more intolerant of each other.
Yet, neither is able to totally displace the other.
Simply put, in recent decades the majority of Quebec Francophones have
been converted to an explicitly Québécois identity. In effect, French-Canadian
nationalism, which can be traced back to the period of New France, has been
transformed from an ethnic to a territorial form. This in turn has fuelled demands for
constitutional change to recognize new identity. Yet, the emergence of this new
Quebec identity, and the nationalism it supports has led to the construction of a
counter-identity a Canadian identity, also territorial in nature, and explicitly designed
to negate it. It, in turn, has become the basis for a new Canadian nationalism, but
one that has functioned primarily in English Canada.
CHANGES IN QUEBEC DURING THE 1960s
The transformation of nationalist ideology in Quebec is a well known story.
With the new conception of the nation as urban, industrial, and modern that became
dominant in the 1960, old constitutional arrangements were no longer sufficient. The
Quebec government needed additional powers if it were to meet its responsibilities
as the only government in Canada controlled by a Francophone majority. By the
same token, now that Francophones formed a modem society their status within
Canada had to be redefined so as to be truly based on equality. Francophones had
always believed that their relationship with the rest of the country must be based on
equality, but English Canadians clearly did not; in fact few of them were even aware
that Francophones saw Canada as a compact.
In short, the 1960s saw growing demands for a formal revision of the
Canadian constitution so as both to entrench a dualist vision of Canada and,
especially, to secure needed powers for the government of Quebec.
INITIAL ATTEMPTS TO ACCOMMODATE NEW DEMANDS FROM QUEBEC
During the 1960s, there were some serious attempts among political and
intellectual leaders to grapple with these issues. First, the notion that Canada is
composed of two founding peoples or nations was endorsed by all three federal
parties. In 1963 the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson created a Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism whose mandate included
recommending "what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation
on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into
account the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of
Canada" (1).
For their part, the Conservatives struggled with the notion of "two nations". In
1967, a thinkers conference at Maison Montmorency in Quebec adopted the position
that Canada is composed of "deux nations", which was rendered "two founding
peoples" in English (2). The New Democratic Party had already confronted the issue
at its founding convention in 1961. On prodding from the Quebec delegates, it agreed
that its programme should include the statement that Canada was created by the
association of two nations and that throughout the document the term "federal"
should be used in place of "national" (3).
As for the status of Quebec itself, during the early 1960s Prime Minister
Pearson openly recognized Quebec's distinctiveness with such statements as:
While Quebec is a province in the national confederation, it is more than a province because
it is the heartland of a people: in a very real sense it is a nation within a nation (4).
Moreover, during this period the Pearson government allowed Quebec to
exercise a de facto particular status by opting out of a large number of joint
federal-provincial cost-shared programmes and even exclusively federal
programmes.
With its commitment to state intervention, the New Democratic Party
recognized that the federal government could not assume its proper role unless
Quebec were to be excluded from its initiatives. Thus, it forthrightly adopted special
status for Quebec at its 1967 convention. Drafted by Charles Taylor, the NDP
position declared that:
In fields of government which touch a community's way of life -fields suchs as social security,
town planning, education and community development- Quebec must have the right and the
fiscal resources to adopt its own programmes and policies in place of those designed and
financed by the federal government. At the same time, the federal government must be able
to play an increased role in these fields where this is desired by the people of other
provinces (5).
For their part, the Progressive Conservatives apparently did not take an
explicit position on the question of Quebec's status, although party leader Robert
Stanfield evoked sufficient openness to the notion to receive the support of le Devoir
editor, Claude Ryan, during the 1968 federal election -in opposition to Quebec's
ostensible favourite son, Pierre Trudeau (6).
Probably, neither of these positions commanded clear majority support
among English-Canadian political and intellectual elites. In all three parties, each was
vigorously challenged (7). But at least the "two nations" thesis and special status for
Quebec were viewed as legitimate positions for discussion, and had advocates in
English Canada.
CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW CANADIAN COUNTER-IDENTITY-AND A NEW
CANADIAN NATIONALISM
By late 1960s, however, this effort to confront directly the new Quebec
nationalism had been replaced with a new strategy: to deny outright Quebec
nationalism, in fact to seek to undermine its underlying bases. In effect, the new
Quebec identity was to be challenged with a new Canadian identity. The primary
architect of this new strategy was, of course, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, a Montreal-based
intellectual and political activist who became Prime Minister in 1968.
Within this new Canadian identity, there are at least five discrete
components: official bilingualism; a charter of rights; multiculturalism; absolute
equality of the provinces and reinforcement of national institutions. Each of these
elements of Canadian political nationality can be directly traced to the fundamental
objective of defeating the Quebec independence movement.
Official Bilingualism
Through official bilingualism the Trudeau government sought to establish the
myth that the French language, and French-speakers, was present throughout
Canada. Demographically, this manifestly is not the case, and never has been. The
use of French has always varied enormously from province to province. Only in
Quebec does the majority (82%) use French; the next largest Francophone
proportion, New Brunswik’s is only 31 %. Moreover, in all provinces but Quebec and
New Brunswick assimilation has been very high. As a result, in most provinces the
proportion of the population which uses primarily French at home is now below 3%
(8). Nonetheless, official bilingualism gave French the same formal status as English
throughout the country, at least for federal purposes, however marginal it might be to
day-to-day life.
On this basis, official bilingualism promised to nullify Quebec's claim to
distinctiveness on the basis of language by making all of Canada like Quebec.
Canada as a whole, rather than just Quebec, would be the home of Francophones.
As Pierre Trudeau declared in 1968 if minority language rights are entrenched
throughout Canada then the French-Canadian nation would stretch from Maillardville
in BC to the Acadian community on the Atlantic Coast:
Once you have done that, Quebec cannot say it alone speaks for French Canadians... Mr.
Robarts will be speaking for French Canadians in Ontario, Mr. Robichaud will be speaking
for French Canadians in New Brunswick, Mr. Thatcher will speak for French Canadians in
Saskatchewan, and Mr. Pearson will be speaking for all French Canadians. Nobody will be
able to say, "I need more power because I speak for the French-Canadian nation" (9).
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Reinforcement of the status of French was, in turn, the central purpose of the
second element of the Trudeau government's pan-Canadian counter identity to
Quebec's: an entrenched bill of rights which was incorporated as part of 1982
constitutional revision. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms deals with many other
rights than linguistic ones: political, legal, mobility, social, etc... But language rights
clearly were its raison d'être (10). The provision for minority-language education
rights is the only section of the Charter not to be subject to the notwithstanding
clause, along with the mobility provision, and, thankfully, the requirement of elections
every five years (along with the various interpretive clauses).
Multiculturalism
A third element of the Canadian identity is multiculturalism, which the
Trudeau government proclaimed in 1971. Canada might have two official languages,
but it was to be seen to have an infinite number of cultures. The federal government
committed itself to "support all of Canada's cultures". Previously, much of the public
discussion had linked bilingualism with biculturalism. It was in these terms that in
1963 the federal government under Lester B. Pearson had established its royal
commission to examine
Canada's national unity crisis: the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism.
The Trudeau government's adoption of a policy of multiculturalism often is
seen simply as a reponse to the demands of Canadians whose origins were neither
British or French. Many of their leaders campaigned against the concept of
biculturalism. Contending that it necessarily excluded their components of the
population, they argued for a more inclusive term. But the Trudeau government
dearly had an additional purpose in rejecting biculturalism for multiculturalism: by
recognizing a multitude of cultures multiculturalism could rein in the notion of duality
and nullify Quebec's claim to distinctiveness on the basis of culture.
From the moment the B&B Commission was created Trudeau and his fellow
Quebec anti-nationalists had been deeply suspicous of the notion of biculturalism.
Their reasoning can be seen in a Cité libre assessment of the B&B Commission's
Preliminary Repport
[the government and the Commission] voluntarily abandon the linguistic dimension (which
provides some concepts which are nonetheless applicable) so as to slip into "biculturalism"
and to talk of equality of citizens in as much as they participate in one of two cultures... And
what is the meaning in practice of a Confederation which "develops according to the
principle of equality between the two cultures?... the idea of equality between peoples
underlines the concept of national sovereignty, and it would have been interesting to see
how the Commission intends to interpret its mandate without being led necessarily to
propose the division of Canada into two national states" (11).
The Equality of the Provinces
The Trudeau government's fierce commitment to the principle of absolute
equality among the provinces was clearly rooted in its determination to counter the
claims of Quebec nationalists.
Insisting that "federalism cannot work unless all the provinces are in basically
the same relation to the central government" (12), Trudeau declared on one occasion
that, "I think particular status for Quebec is the biggest intellectual hoax ever foisted
on the people of Quebec and the people of Canada" (13).
Reinforcement of National Institutions
Finally, this insistence on a uniform federalism was coupled with a
determination that the federal government play a significant role in the lives of all
Canadians (Québécois included), whether it be through programmes of direct
transfer payments, such as Family Allowances, or major national undertakings, such
as the National Energy Program. From the late 1960s onwards Ottawa was greatly
concerned that its actions be "visible" to Canadians (14).
CONTRADICTORY IMPACT OF NEW CANADIAN "COUNTER-IDENTITY"
Not surprisingly, the new Canadian identity has not fared well in French
Quebec, the population for which in fact it had been designed, Not only has the
conception of Canada as a bilingual nation with a strong Francophone presence from
coast to coast lacked credibility in Quebec, but the principle of formal equality
between English and French increasingly has appeared as an obstacle to the types
of intervention by the Quebec state needed to strengthen the role of French within
the province. As for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, studies show that
Francophones are as supportive as are Anglophones of the rights contained in it -but
the instance of Bill 178 demonstrated that they are not prepared to give it priority over
a measure such as Bill 101 that they judge to be essential to their cultural survival.
With respect to the notion of a multicultural society, French Quebec has become
increasingly prepared to view itself as a society drawing upon a variety of cultural
groups, but has shown no disposition to apply the concept of multiculturalism to its
own status within Canada as a whole. Finally, Quebec Francophones have shown
themselves to be more resistant than ever to the notion that Quebec constitutes a
province exactly like the others and should have precisely the same constitutional
status.
On the other land, each of these elements of a new "pan-Canadian" identity
has had a certain resonance in English Canada. Many English Canadians have
embraced them as the basis of their own conception of Canada. In particular, the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has become a central element of the dominant
notion of Canadian nationhood. Equally entrenched is the principle of absolute
equality of the provinces: as we shall see, this was amply demonstrated in opposition
to the Meech Lake Accord and support for Senate reform based on the "Triple E"
model. Many English Canadians have come to see Canadian society as multicultural
and to value the ideal of a bilingual Canada. Finally, the strength of English-Canadian
attachment to Canadian national institutions has been revealed in a variety of ways,
including opposition to the Free Trade Agreement and resistance to decentralization
of powers to the provinces.
Trudeau's success in mobilizing the federal government, and a good number
mainly of English-speaking Canadians, on behalf of this new Canadian identity
presents some striking ironies. Whereas the strategy had been designed to transform
the way in which Quebec Francophones saw Canada, instead its impact has been
primarily upon another population: English Canadians. In fact, the new Canadian
identity that Trudeau helped to formulate has become the basis for a new Canadian
nationalism which enjoys strong support in much of English-speaking Canada,
although not Quebec. Yet, Trudeau had always professed a deep opposition to all
forms of nationalism. This was the rationale for his fierce rejection of Quebec
nationalism and his decision to enter federal politics in order to combat it.
Ultimately, this new Canadian nationalism has rendered virtually impossible
any constitutional reponse to the new Quebec identity. As a consequence, rather
than leading to national integration, federal dissemination of this new "pan-Canadian"
identity has driven Canadians further apart.
Within the terms of the new Canadian identity it is virtually impossible to
comprehend the claims of Quebec nationalists. After all, it was constructed precisely
to counter and negate the new Quebec identity that they had fashioned in the early
1960s. Thus, the linguistic dimension of Quebec's identity is incomprehensible since
thanks to official bilingualism French is seen as enjoying a privileged status
throughout Canada, robbing Quebec of any distinctiveness. Thanks to
multiculturalism, the cultural dimension of the Quebec identity loses its meaning:
Canada is now seen as composed of a multiplicity of cultural groups. Neither French
Canada nor Quebec can have any special claim. And, in light of both the principle of
absolute equality of the provinces and the attachment to national political institutions
there is no basis left for comprehending Quebec's claim that its distinctiveness
requires the exercise of additional powers. The impact of these various principles in
foreclosing any recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness is, of course, only reinforced
by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
While Trudeau would indeed not want any such response to be made, and
has been ready even in retirement to intervene publicly so as to ensure that it does
not happen, there is surely some irony that his most powerful ally should be the
"irrational forces" of nationalism.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES AS PROTRACTED STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO
NATIONALISMS
1982 Constitutional Repatriation
The new Canadian nationalism was almost perfectly expressed in the 1982
constitutional revision. In fact, the terms of the revision follow precisely the agenda
that Pierre Trudeau proclaimed in the late 1960s: the primary objective was to link
patriation to entrenchment of a bill of rights. Only when this was accomplished might
attention be given to the division of powers, and any expansion of Quebec's
jurisdictions.
Indeed the 1982 constitutional revision dealt only marginally with the division
of powers, and in a way that had little significance to the Quebec government.
Instead the focus was upon a Charter of Rights and Freedoms which would define for
all Canadians both their rights in dealing with the state and services that the state
was obliged to provide to them. Among these rights, as we have seen, language
rights were a clear priority. By the same token, language rights are defined in purely
individual terms. At the same time, the Charter clearly recognizes Canada's
multicultural character.
As if to underline the point that the Constitution Act, 1982, was an
embodiment of the new Canadian nationalism, it was rejected by not just the Quebec
government, then occupied by the Parti québécois, but by most federalists within
Quebec's provincial political elite. For its part, the Trudeau government was
undeterred, contending that Parliament and only Parliament could speak for Canada
as a whole -in effect for the Canadian nation. Thus, it was fully entitled to act over
Quebec's objections, whether or not it had the support of the remaining provincial
governments.
Meech Lake Accord
The original purpose of the Accord was manifest. It was intended to resolve
the deficiency of the 1982 constitutional revision: Canada had patriated its
constitution but without Quebec signature. In fact, it grew out of a statement made by
Quebec's minister of intergovernmental relations in 1985 in which he outlined five
conditions for Quebec's adhesion to the constitution. Reflecting the Quebec
government's desire to reach an agreement despite its weak bargaining position, the
conditions were modest in scope. Combined with a sixth element, these conditions
were the basis for an agreement among all ten provincial premiers and the prime
minister reached on April 30th, 1987, at the prime minister's summer retreat near
Meech Lake.
The Accord boiled down to six measures, all of which long had been under
discussion in intergovernmental circles and some of which had actually been
proposed by the federal government at one time or another: limitation of the federal
government’s use of its spending in exclusive provincial jurisdictions; designation by
provincial governments of lists of nominees for the Supreme Court and the Senate;
an addition of three items to the subjects of constitutional revision requiring
unanimous consent by the provinces; constitutionalization of an agreement between
Ottawa and Quebec with respect to immigration, with extension of the same
procedure to any other matters requiring unanimous consent of the provinces; and
simultaneous recognition of Canada's dualistic nature and Quebec's status as a
"distinct society". By any standard, it was a modest package -and certainly a minimal
response to the aspirations of Quebec nationalists.
Nonetheless, within English-Canadian public opinion there rapidly emerged
strong opposition to the Accord. There were several bases of opposition. Many
complained about the process through which the Accord was generated, claiming
that it involved insufficient popular consultation. And there was widespread concern
that such measures as the limitation of the spending power would seriously
undermine the capacity of the federal government to pursue national objectives.
However, there is clear evidence that the primary bases of opposition had to
deal with the provision declaring Quebec to be a distinct society. A survey taken in
June, 1987, found that among all the provisions of the accord this one had the least
support. By the same token, a study in late 1988 found that when English-Canadian
respondents were informed that the accord contained such a clause, opposition to
the accord increased by 28 percentage points (15).
In part, this opposition clearly reflected hostility to the very notion of
constitutionally recognizing Quebec's specificity. Many objected to the idea that
securing Quebec's accession to the constitution should be the essential purpose of
constitutional revision. After all, they claimed, the Quebec question had been settled
with the 1980 referendum and the 1982 constitutional revision.
In other cases, opposition to the "distinct society" clause was articulated in
terms of overriding principles of the new Canadian nationalism. Opponents of the
Accord would declare that they agree wholeheartedly with the objective of addressing
Quebec's legitimate concerns but only if some superior principle is upheld whether it
be: unimpeded preeminence of the Charter; absolute equality in the status of
provinces; multiculturalism; or formal equality between English and French. In effect,
thanks to these new principles of Canadian political life, there was no room left to
address the Quebec question.
Finally, in June of 1990 time ran out for the Meech Lake Accord. Three years
had elapsed since the Accord received its first ratification by a legislature, Quebec's
Assemblée Nationale. It still had not been ratified by all the provincial legislatures:
Newfounland had rescinded its ratification and Manitoba had yet to ratify it.
Accordingly, under the terms of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Accord had become a
dead letter.
The collapse of the Accord triggered a deep reaction in Quebec. Not without
reason, many Quebec Francophones interpreted English-Canadian rejection
opposition to the Accord as stemming from rejection of their claims for recognition of
Quebec's distinct status. Rejection of the Accord was seen as no less than rejection
of Quebec itself. The resulting sense of resentment and humiliation caused support
for Quebec sovereignty to reach unprecedented levels, going from 40% in
September, 1989, to 56% in March, 1990 to 64% in the following November, with
only 30% opposed (16).
CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD
After a long hesitation, in the fall of 1991 the federal government sought to
initiative discussions by presenting a comprehensive plan for constitutional revision.
After a series of false starts the prime minister and all ten provincial premiers finally
agreed in August 1992 on a document; the Charlottetown Accord.
In order to understand the dynamics that led to this Accord it is important to
refer to a document that preceded and largely determined it: the July 7th accord that
was signed by the federal government, representatives of Aboriginal peoples and the
premiers of all provinces but Quebec. After the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord,
the Quebec government had declared that it would no longer participate in
constitutional discussions; instead it would wait for the rest of the country to formulate
a proposal for a "renewed federalism" to which Quebec would then react. The Rest of
the Country did precisely that. But in doing so it drew up a scheme that was fully
consistent with the constitutional vision prevailing in the rest of Canada, largely
shaped by the new Canadian nationalism, and which for the very same reason was
unacceptable to Quebec.
A central tenet of the new Canadian nationalism, and basis of objection to the
Meech Lake Accord, is of course the principle of formal equality among the
provinces. Thus, with respect to Quebec's claims for recognition the Charlottetown
Accord did contain a "distinct society" interpretative clause patterned after that of the
Meech Lake Accord. However the significance of the clause was attenuated by the
fact that it now was carefully inserted within a "Canada Clause", in which it stood as
one of eight principal characteristics of Canada (17). (At the same time, it also was to
be inserted in the Charter as an interpretative provision).
Second, out of deference to the new Canadian nationalism's commitment to
strengthen national institutions, the July 7th agreement contained no major
attenuation of federal powers. By and large, any reinforcement of provincial power
was in areas already under provincial jurisdiction.
Perhaps the clearest instance of enhancement of provincial power was in the
"six sisters": urban affairs, tourism, recreation, housing, mining and forestry. There,
provinces could force a total federal withdrawal. Nonetheless, not only are these all
areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, but they are areas in which federal activity
(based upon the spending power) is in any event minimal.
With respect to labour market development and training, provincial
governments were granted the right to oblige federal withdrawal from training and
labour market development activities. However, the federal government could
continue to play an important role through its responsibility for setting national
objectives which the provinces would be bound to respect (18).
Similary in the case of cultural affairs, the agreement declared that there
should be a constitutional amendment specifying that "Provinces should have
exclusive jurisdiction over cultural matters within the provinces" but stipulated that the
proposed amendment would also recognize "the continuing responsibility of the
federal government in Canadian cultural matters. The federal government should
retain responsibility for national cultural institutions, including grants and contributions
delivered by these institutions" (19).
To be sure, the accord did incorporate the spending power provisions of the
Meech Lake Accord, setting up conditions under which provinces would have the
right to establish their own programs with compensation. But these constraints apply
only to cost-shared programs within exclusively provincial jurisdictions. By the same
token, as many Quebec jurists have noted, the provision has the effect of giving the
federal spending power a much clearer constitutional sanction than ever before.
Similary, it incorporated the Meech Lake provisions regarding immigration -a
concurrent jurisdiction in which the federal government remains paramount.
Finally, the July 7th agreement contained the project of constitutional reform
that was most strongly favoured in much of English-speaking Canada outside
Ontario: to make central institutions more responsive to Western Canada and Atlantic
Canada (or Outer Canada). This project, which had become known as the "Triple E"
Senate, found much of its legitimacy within the new Canadian nationalism.
Representation was to be based upon equality of the provinces. And rather than
weakening national institutions, defenders argued, the reform would strengthen them
by allowing Outer Canada to participate more fully in national political life.
Thus, under the July 7th Accord, the Senate was to be composed of an equal
number of elected representatives (eight) from each province, plus two from each
territory and an undetermined number of aboriginal representatives. Moreover, it had
a clear promise of being "effective": a simple majority could veto bills "that involve
fundamental tax policy changes directly related to natural resources"; on most other
bills 60% could force reconciliation and, if needed, a joint sitting of the House and
Senate; 70% could veto a bill outright (20).
In short, the July 7th agreement fell squerely within the parameters of the
new Canadian nationalism. It contained scarcely a nod toward Quebec nationalism,
with its concern with the status and powers of the Quebec government. The primary
reference to Quebec's specificity, the "distinct society" clause, was devoid of any
such notion. It respected the clearly stated desire of most English Canadians that the
roles of the federal government not be weakened in any fundamental manner. At the
same time, it offered a Senate reform which clearly met the "Triple E" criteria.
Of course, the process giving rise to the July 7th agreement had virtually
guaranteed such a result: Quebec was not formally a party to negotiations.
Nonetheless, even when Quebec Premier Bourassa finally joined the negotiations
Quebec's project was not seriously incorporated. Apparently most negotiators
presumed that Quebec's project was necessarily in conflict with English Canada's.
Instead of adding elements desired by Quebec, centering upon the division of
powers, the framers of the Charlottetown Accord sought to accommodate Quebec
through modifications in an entirely different area: Canada's national institutions.
First, they substantially diluted a major element of what was already there,
the Senate reform so coveted by Outer Canada (21). Not surprisingly, this had the
effect of undermining support for the package in Outer Canada.
Second, and partly as compensation for the latter, they introduced measures
reinforcing Quebec's representation within the House of Commons -further alienating
Outer Canadians. First, Quebec (and Ontario) were given additional seats in the
House. Quebec went from 75 to 93 seats. Even more dramatically, Quebec was to
be guaranteed 25 % of the seats of the House, in perpetuity. Finally, for good
measure the new Senate was to requiure a majority of Francophone Senators on any
matter which "materially affects the French language or culture in Canada". (To be
sure, the Senators would not necessarily come from Quebec alone). In addition,
Charlottetown incorporated the Meech Lake Accord's provision constitutionalizing
Quebec's right to three of nine positions on the Supreme Court (22).
These changes represent, moreover, perhaps the most substancial of all
alterations of the July 7th agreement. Yet, representation in central institutions had
not been a priority of the Quebec government. In fact, reduced representation might
have been acceptable. The Quebec government had not even proposed the
guarantee of 25% seats in the House of Commons. Apparently, it was proposed by
Saskatchewn premier Roy Romanow. Not only did the measure fail to respond to
Quebec's aspirations but it had the added effect of producing a backlash in the rest of
the country.
In sum, the framers of the Charlottetown Accord desperately sought to
remain faithful to the constitutional vision contained within the new Canadian
nationalism that has come to dominate English Canada. As a consequence, they
attempted to accommodate Quebec's not by responding to its constitutional
aspirations but by adopting measures that Quebec political leaders had not even
called for. Yet, as it happened, these measures directly undermined the primary
project for constitutional reform coming out of English Canada and sanctified by the
new Canadian nationalism: improved representation for Western and Atlantic
Canada in central institutions.
As a result, the Charlottetown Accord managed to offend both Quebec
nationalism and the new Canadian nationalism. It did not offer the significant
expansion of Quebec jurisdictions that was the indispensable benchmark for Quebec
nationalists. Yet, in reinforcing the Quebec presence in national institutions it
profoundly offended the new Canadian nationalism's commitment to the equally of
the provinces, in the process frustrating Outer Canada's desire for more equitable
representation. In short, neither Quebec nor English Canada (especially outside
Ontario) was left with a dear reason to support the project. And, indeed, in the
subsequent referendum the Accord was resoundingly defeated both in French
Quebec and in much of Outer Canada. Within Quebec, 56.7% voted "No", with
43.3% in favour; outside Quebec 54.3% voted "No", with 45.7% in favour. In only four
provinces did the "Yes" side prevail: Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New
Brunswick and Ontario -and the Ontario vote was a virtual dead heat (23).
THE FUTURE FOR CANADA AND QUEBEC
At the moment the most likely scenario seems to be a playing out yet again
of the same fired debate borne of this competition between nationalisms. The Parti
québécois wins the upcoming provincial election. English-Canadian opinion is not
prepared to consider new approaches to the constitutional question, and will not even
tolerate discussion of it. For its part the federal government is loathe to initiate
constitutional discussions partly from an understandable fear of failure, given the
record to date, but also from fear that with Jean Chrétien at the helm any federal
constitutional initiative will only stir up memories in Quebec of the Trudeau
constitutional revision, and Chrétien's role in it. In the end, however, a majority of
Quebec voters vote against sovereignty -not through any hope that Canadian
federalism might be renewed but through fear of the costs, primarily economic, of
Quebec independence. With such a result English Canada will conclude that the
national unity question has been resolved once and for all. Quebec nationalists will
abandon politics only to return when inevitably the push and pull of Canadian politics
brings questions of identity and national honour to the fore once again.
Of course, there is always the possibility that this time a majority may simply
decide that the risks of independence are worth taking and vote "yes". Indeed,
Quebec independence is a viable option and the costs of securing it might turn out to
be less than many have presumed. But this all depends on how independence is
secured: how quickly Canada and Quebec can agree on the terms; what the terms
are; how the process is perceived in financial circles, and so on. At this point, no one
knows. There is no reason to believe that the process would be anything like what is
occurring in present day Yugoslavia, to cite the most dramatic example. But it could
be much trickier than Czechoslovakia's recent partition. The readiness of Quebec
Aboriginals and much of English-Canadian opinion to question the borders of a
sovereign Quebec is sufficient to guarantee that.
In short, whether the scenario is continued constitutional stalemate or a
difficult transition to Quebec independence it is not an attractive one. Thus, there is a
lot to be said for breaking out of the sterile debate which seems to make inevitable
one or the other. To do this means somehow to go beyond the individualistic
conception of Canada now so firmly rooted in Canadian political life to one that will
allow for and accommodate the presence of distinct collectivities. How can this be
done?
A CANADA COMPOSED OF DISTINCT COLLECTIVITIES
In part, the answers may be found by looking back to the 1960s when these
issues were first seriously discussed at the national level and before the Trudeau
vision of Canada had preempted the exploration of alternatives. A good place to start
would be some of the writings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism which Prime Minister Lester Pearson had mandated:
to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the
basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the
contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the
measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution (24);
In its early deliberations, the Commission had interpreted its operative
concepts expansively, in collective rather than individual terms. Treating culture as "a
way of being, thinking and feeling", the Commission saw Canada as containing "two
dominant cultures... embodied in distinct societies" (25). On this basis, it was Canada
as a whole, rather than individual Canadians, that was bicultural: individuals who live
by two cultures would be schizophrenic. For that matter, few Canadians could ever
be truly bilingual: "complete bilingualism -the equal command of two languages- is
rare and perhaps impossible". A bilingual country is one in which institutions provide
services in two languages, "not one where all inhabitants necessarily speak two
languages" (26). In short, Canada's dualism was one of two collectivities, not only
speaking different languages but living according to different cultures within distinct
societies.
Defined in such sweeping terms, cultural difference is bound to have
implications for political institutions, including the structures of federalism, especially
when the objective is to create an equal partnership between cultures. Apparently,
the B&B Commission had intended to draw the broad outlines of a constitutional
order that would be compatible with its vision of a bicultural Canada. For a variety of
reasons, this never happened.
As we have seen, it is in part because of these implications that the Trudeau
government abandoned the concept of biculturalism and was careful to drain the
concept of bilingualism of any collective overtones, just as it avoided any talk of equal
partnership among collectivities, as opposed to individual Canadians.
Nonetheless, even now these notions could provide some direction out of the
present dialogue des sourds. The primary difficulty with the B&B Commission's
formulation of Canada is that it excluded Aboriginal peoples. (Certainly, the phrase
"equal partnership between the two founding races" sounds strange to contemporary
ears -even if one accepts that in 1960s English Canada "race" did not necessarily
imply skin colour). Here, some important work has been done within the formulation
of "three nations". During the most recent of constitutional discussions this concept
not only was advanced in a manifesto by a group of English-Canadian intellectuals it
became the official policy of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women
(27).
ASYMMETRY
As for the institutional form for this new conception of Canada, here too it
would be useful to look at developments in the 1960s. Before Trudeau's vision of a
Canadian identity had achieved hegemony in federal circles, there was considerable
experimentation with the concept of asymmetry in the distribution of functions
between federal and provincial governments. Meeting Quebec's demands need not
entail a general weakening of the federal government, as with decentralization of
powers to all the provinces. Under schemes of asymmetry, any decentralization of
powers could go to Quebec alone; Ottawa would continue to perform these functions
in the rest of the country. In effect, English Canada could continue to have as strong
a federal government as it wished (28).
In the early 1960s the Pearson government allowed Quebec to exercise a de
facto particular status by opting out of a large number of joint federal-provincial
cost-shared programmes and even exclusively federal programmes. In doing so, it
was simply building on past precedents. In 1954, Maurice Duplessis had
reestablished Quebec's own personal income tax, using tax room to be vacated by
Ottawa (29). In 1959, the Diefenbaker government had agreed to vacate corporate
income tax room in Quebec so as to allow Quebec city to recover funds which, in the
rest of Canada, were paid directly to universities (30).
To be sure, asymmetry would raise some institutional problems. In particular,
critics have wondered about the propriety of Quebec M.P.'s voting on measures
which, under asymmetry, do not apply to Quebec and of Quebec M.P.'s assuming
Cabinet portfolios which involve programs which do not function in Quebec. But the
problem should not be exaggerated. After all, Quebec M.P.'s have voted on laws
dealing with the Canada Pension Plan, even though Quebec has its own Quebec
Pension Plan, and two Quebec M.P.'s even have assumed responsibility for these
programs as Ministers of Health and Welfare: Monique Bégin and Marc Lalonde.
Even then, there may be ways to alleviate these complications. For instance, Quebec
M.P.'s may simply not vote on these measures -they would not be votes of
confidence. If, as would most likely be the case, such a formal limitation of the right to
opt out to Quebec alone would be politically untenable in English Canada, it might be
extended to all provinces but with procedural requirements that would preclude it
from being used frivolously; a 2/3's majority in a provincial legislature or approval in a
popular referendum.
Nor is Outer Canada's desire for more power at the center incompatible with
Quebec's desire for greater provincial autonomy. In fact, under certain assumptions
they are highly compatible. Presuming that under asymmetry Quebec M.P.'s would
not vote on measures that do not apply to Quebec, Outer Canada would in these
instances dominate the House of Commons. Without Quebec M.P.'s voting, Outer
Canada M.P.'s would have a majority of the seats. To this extent, a "Triple E" Senate
might not even be necessary to accommodate Western Canadian concerns (31). If it
were to prove necessary, a "Triple E" Senate might still be made acceptable to
Quebec by coupling it with a major expansion in Quebec's power (32).
Beyond the Trudeau vision's approach to federal-provincial relations,
stressing the absolute equality of the provinces, the concept of asymmetry could
profitably be applied to each of the other elements of the new Canadian identity.
Uniform application of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms might be tempered in the
case of Quebec by a recognition of Quebec's particular cultural imperatives: this
would have been the primary effect of the Meech Lake Accords's "distinct society"
clause. Language rights and Canadian bilingualism could be conceived so as to
recognize that the Quebec government must act to support the province's majority
language in a way that no other province needs to support its majority language; and
that there is a fundamental asymmetry between the situation of the Quebec
Anglophone minority and the Francophone minorities of the other provinces. Finally,
it may even be time to recognize the artificiality of a conception of Canadian
multiculturalism that in effect places on precisely the same plane all claims for
cultural specificity and distinctiveness.
To be sure, over twenty-five years have passed since the Trudeau
government began the effort to implant the new Canadian identity. Federal
government policies to disseminate and implement the new values seem to be well
entrenched. Through formal revision they are now embedded in the Canadian
constitution.
Nonetheless, the recent debate over Aboriginal rights is highly suggestive.
After all, in the case of Aboriginal peoples the Charlottetown Accord was forthright in
its recognition that they constitute distinct collectivities in Canada. The proposed
Canada Clause was to contain a provision declaring that:
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern this land, have the right
to promote their languages, cultures and traditions and to ensure the integrity of their
societies, and their governments constitute one of three orders of government in Canada
(33).
By the same token, recognizing that "The Aboriginal peoples of Canada have
the inherent right of self-government within Canada", the Accord would have
launched a process through which the federal, provincial and territorial governments
would each enter into "good faith" negotiation with Aboriginal peoples of agreements
through which this right would be implemented (34). Clearly, there would have been
enormous variation, or asymmetry, among these many agreements.
The proposals appeared to have enjoyed quite broad support in English
Canada. The basic concepts did not seem to generate the controversy they do when
applied to Quebec. The proposals received less sympathy in Francophone Quebec,
but this was in part because of English-Canadian refusal to apply the same concepts
to Quebec.
In the last analysis, Canada can persist as a federal system but only if
federalism is taken seriously and its potentials are fully exploited. Rather than
seeking to find symmetry and impose uniformity we should be actively pursuing
asymmetry and using federalism to accommodate differences in needs and
aspirations. Despite his much-professed attachment to federalism, Trudeau rejected
much of what federalism has to offer and through such measures as the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms implanted a discourse that is fundamentally anti-federalist. The
obstacles to restoring a truly federal vision of Canada, based on the recognition that
Canada is indeed a multinational state, would seem to be staggering. Yet, the
alternatives are distinctly unattractive.
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